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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 970443-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
-vs-

Priority No. 2

JOSE A. FIDEL GARCIA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Jose A. Fidel Garcia appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs (DUI), Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 1997), a class B misdemeanor.
The conviction was entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, West Valley
Department, the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I. Did the trial court correctly hold that State regulations governing the monthly
certification of alcohol breath testing instruments do not require the certifying officer to record,
in the certification log, the actual readings obtained when the instruments measure samples of
known alcohol content? This Court will not defer to the trial court's interpretation of the
regulations in question. However, it is appropriate to grant some deference to an administrative
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agency's interpretation of its own regulations, see, e.g., Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm 7i, 811 P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah 1991). Accordingly, this Court should defer to the Utah
Public Safety Department's interpretation of its breath testing regulations.
II. If the trial court incorrectly interpreted the breath testing regulations, and if this Court
holds that the regulations were violated in this case, then what remedy is due for this defendant
and for similarly-situated DUI defendants? Because the trial court did not answer this question,
this Court will review it de novo; no deference is possible.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The pertinent "due process" clause, U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1, proclaims:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.. .." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993) is the statute governing admissibility of alcohol breath
test results; it is copied in appendix B of defendant's Brief of Appellant. Utah Admin. Code §
R714-500, enacted pursuant to section 41-6-44.3, contains the regulations that are the subject of
this appeal; it is copied in appendix C of defendant's Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI)
following a stop and arrest on 05-06 April 1996. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress the result
of his postarrest breath alcohol test, asserting that the monthly certification log for the breathtesting instrument had been improperly kept, and that therefore, the breath test result was
inadmissible. Upon consideration of the parties' memoranda and arguments, the trial court
denied that motion by written ruling (R. 68-74) (copied in Br. of Appellant appendix A). On 30
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May 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to DUI, reserving, pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) and
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial
suppression motion. He was sentenced to jail term, probation, and a fine; the jail and fine were
stayed pending this appeal (R. 130-31).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts are undisputed. Following his DUI arrest, defendant Garcia's breath
was tested with an "Intoxilyzer 5000" instrument. This brand and model of instrument is
commonly used in Utah for breath-testing of DUI arrestees.
To assure the Intoxilyzers' accuracy, "certified breath alcohol testing technicians" inspect
them every month (the pertinent regulation, Utah Admin Code § R714-500-6D(3), calls for an
inspection every forty days). Regulations governing these monthly inspections have been
established by the Utah Department of Public Safety, as directed under Utah Code Ann. §41-644.3 (1993). During these inspections, the Intoxilyzers are tested for their ability to measure
"known reference samples," or "simulator solutions" of known alcohol content, equivalent to
known weights of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, within an accuracy tolerance of .005 gram per
210 liters, or 5 percent, whichever is greater. This accuracy standard is prescribed by regulation,
Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(3) (Br. of Appellant appendix C), and must be satisfied in
order for the instrument(s) to be certified for use. The technicians keep a certification log
("permanent record book"), as required by Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-6D(5), recording the
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Intoxilyzers' performance on the monthly known reference sample testing, along with other
criteria used to certify that the instruments are functioning properly.1
The certified breath alcohol testing technician for Salt Lake area Intoxilyzers is Utah
Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Hathcock. In his monthly certification log, Trooper Hathcock has
not recorded the numeric readings obtained during the Intoxilyzers' measurement of known
reference samples. Instead, Hathcock's log simply notes "OK" for each inspection date on which
the Intoxilyzers satisfied the .005 gram or 5 percent accuracy standard (a partial copy of the log
for the Intoxilyzer used in this case is in Br. of Appellant appendix D). Thus if the instrument
tested a reference sample known to have a .200 alcohol content, and the test reading was between
.190 and .210 (the 5 percent standard), the certification log entry would be "OK."
The foregoing method of recording the known reference sample testing has not always
been used. Prior to September 1995, Trooper Hathcock wrote the actual numeric readings for
known reference sample testing in the log. Thus if the known reference sample was .200, and the
Intoxilyzer measured that sample as .202, the certification log would so reflect (see Br. of
Appellant appendix D). Beginning in September 1995, however, the "OK" notation was utilized
(see id). That recordkeeping method was used until approximately March 1997, when DUI
defendants began challenging it in the trial courts: at that time, Trooper Hathcock reinstituted the
practice of writing the actual readings in his certification log. As can be seen from review of the
log in this case, at the time this defendant's breath was tested, in April 1996, the "OK" method of
noting the known reference sample testing was used.

*The certification log also notes other aspects of the intruments' performance which are tested monthly. Those
other performance criteria are not at issue in this appeal.
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Besides noting results of known reference sample testing in the certification log, the
technician also completes a sworn "Intoxilyzer Affidavit" for each instrument following each
monthly inspection. Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993), Intoxilyzer Affidavits are
utilized, in lieu of live testimony by the certified breath test technician, to prove that the
instrument used to test a particular defendant for breath alcohol content was performing
accurately. In a process that this Court has dubbed "bookending," see State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d
469, 471 (Utah App. 1989), trial courts accept Intoxilyzer Affidavits commemorating the
monthly Intoxilyzer certification conducted before and after the breath test of the particular
defendant: If the Affidavits show that the instrument passed those "bookend" certification tests,
they trigger a statutory presumption that the defendant's test result is accurate, and therefore,
admissible. See id. (The Intoxilyzer Affidavits pertaining to this case are copied in appendix I of
this brief.)
The Intoxilyzer Affidavits recite the .005 gram or 5 percent accuracy standard set forth in
the Administrative Code.2 Therefore, by checking "yes" in that section of the Intoxilyzer
Affidavit, the technician certifies, under oath, that the instrument satisfied this accuracy standard
during the monthly "bookend" inspection in question. That sworn "yes" entry corresponds to the
"OK" entry (or numeric entry) in the certification log.
Defendant challenges the "OK" method of documenting the known reference sample test
measurements in the monthly certification log. In short, he argues that "OK is not OK."
According to defendant, the pre-September 1995 method—that is, writing the actual numeric
2

The pertinent section of the Intoxilyzer Affidavit reads: "Checked with known sample: (simulator, 3 tests within
+ or - .005 or 5 % whickever is the greatest)," followed by checkspaces for "yes" or "no."
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readings for known reference sample testing in the log—is required under the pertinent
regulations. Furthermore, argues defendant, Trooper Hathcock's violation of the regulations
amounts to a constitutional "due process" violation, requiring suppression of the breath alcohol
result in his case—and in every other DUI case involving the "OK" documentation method.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court correctly held that the Public Safety Department regulations permit
entry of "OK" in the monthly certification log, rather than actual readings, to record the
Intoxilyzers' performance on known reference sample testing. Defendant's contrary reading of
the regulations erroneously conflates discrete portions of the regulations, out of context, to
support his desired result. In fact, the regulations contain no plain directive to enter the actual
known reference sample measurements. Because "OK" means that the Intoxilyzer measured
known reference samples within the strict, .005 gram or 5 percent standard, there is nothing
wrong with entering "OK," rather than the actual number, in the certification log.
II. Even if defendant's reading of the regulations were correct, Trooper Hathcock's
failure to obey those regulations would not justify the broad remedy of suppression, or exclusion,
of the breath test result in this and similar cases. Failure to obey administrative regulations does
not ipso facto amount to a constitutional violation. No constitutional principle commands entry
of the actual known reference sample measurements into the certification log; therefore, it would
be improper to suppress breath test results for failure to so record those measurements.
Furthermore, the statute addressing admissibility of breath test results does not make
perfect compliance with the regulations a sine qua non for admission of such results at trial.
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Instead, the statute merely permits foundation for breath test results to be laid by hearsay. If the
hearsay-based foundation is insufficient, the statute does not authorize exclusion of breath test
results, but rather, permits the necessary foundation to be established by live testimony. Thus the
only remedy to which defendant might be entitled is an order requiring the prosecution to
establish the necessary foundation by live testimony, rather than by hearsay.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
BREATH TEST REGULATIONS DO NOT REQUIRE ENTRY
OF ACTUAL NUMERIC READINGS FOR MONTHLY
TESTING ON KNOWN REFERENCE SAMPLES
The trial court rejected defendant Garcia's argument that the breath test regulations
require entry, into the monthly certification log, of the numeric readings yielded on known
reference sample testing (R. 72-73, Br. of Appellant appendix A). This Court will revisit the
meaning of the regulations as a legal question, without deference to the trial court. However, at
least "intermediate" deference is proper toward a government agency's interpretation of its own
regulations in a case such as this one, involving delegated legislative authority and the
application of technical expertise. See Thorup Bros. Const, v. Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax
Comm % 860 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah 1993); Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 811
P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991); Barnard v. Motor Vehicle Div. of Utah State Tax Comm % 905 P.2d
317, 320 (Utah App. 1995). In this case, deference would be appropriate toward the Utah
Highway Patrol, the branch of the Utah Public Safety Department that implements the breath test
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regulations. But regardless of the deference level, the trial court's interpretation of the breath test
regulations should be affirmed.
Proper analysis of the regulations begins with an understanding of Utah Code Ann. § 416-44.3 (1993), the breath test statute, under which the breath test regulations were developed.
The statute sets forth a method for proving, by hearsay, that a DUI defendant's breath was tested
by an accurate instrument. Admissibility of such proof requires that three conditions be satisfied:
(1) the hearsay—in this case, Intoxilyzer Affidavits and monthly certification logs—must reflect
compliance with the breath test regulations; (2) the hearsay documents must be made in the
regular course of, and contemporaneously to, the acts recorded therein; and (3) the source of the
hearsay information must be trustworthy. See subsec. 41-6-44.3(2) (paraphrased and reordered).
In this case, the first of the foregoing three conditions is in dispute—that is, the question
whether Trooper Hathcock complied with the breath test regulations when he prepared the
Intoxilyzer Affidavits and certification log for the instrument used to test defendant's breath. As
follows, Trooper Hathcock did comply with those regulations—as properly interpreted.
Defendant's argument notwithstanding, nothing in the breath test regulations squarely
requires the technician to write the actual numeric readings, for monthly testing of known
reference samples, in the certification log. The regulations contain no direct command, such as:
"The numeric results of testing on known reference samples, performed under section R714-5006(3), shall be recorded in the monthly certification log." Indeed, in his analysis purporting to
prove that the regulations' "plain language" establishes such a requirement, defendant invokes no
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less than four (and as many as eleven) discrete sections and subsections of the regulations (Br. of
Appellant at 9-14). In short, what defendant says is "plain," is anything but.
By citing so many discrete regulatory provisions, defendant Garcia strains to reach the
result that he desires. It must be recalled that the breath test statute focuses on testing with an
accurate instrument. Toward that end, section R714-500-5 of the breath test regulations
addresses "Instrument Certification." Regulation section 5 sets forth standards for assuring
instrument accuracy—including the requirement that the instruments measure reference samples
within .005 gram or 5 percent of their known alcohol content. Utah Admin. Code § R714-5005B(3). Nothing in this regulatory subsection, nor in the balance of section R714-500-5,
commands the breath test technician to record the known reference sample readings in any
particular manner.
In fact, the ensuing subsection, R.714-500-5B(4), provides latitude in the instrument
certification requirements: "The specificity of the [certification] procedure shall be adequate and
appropriate for the reasonable analysis of breath specimen for the determination of alcohol
concentration in law enforcement." This latitude is reiterated in yet another subsection of the
instrument certification regulation, requiring "any other tests deemed necessary by the
Department [of Public Safety] to correctly and adequately evaluate the instrument, give
reasonably correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical and reliable for law
enforcement purposes." Utah Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(5).
Because there is latitude plainly built into the instrument certification procedure, the fair
and reasonable implication is that there must also be latitude built into the manner in which that
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procedure is recorded. Indeed, the instrument certification regulation is silent about the contents
of the certification log: it merely dictates "[t]he instrument functions to be checked," Utah
Admin. Code § R714-500-5B(4), including, without elaboration, the requirement that the
instrument be tested on known reference samples. Thus a fair reading of the instrument
certification regulation is simply that the certification log, or any documentation of the monthly
inspection and certification process, must show that the instrument satisfied the .005 or 5 percent
accuracy standard. That, of course, is precisely what the notation "OK," in Trooper Hathcock's
monthly certification log, along with the Intoxilyzer Affidavits, do in this case.
Doggedly pursuing his "OK is not OK" theory, defendant jumps track from the
instrument certification regulations, just discussed, to the program certification requirements of
R714-500-6 (Br. of Appellant at 11). Those section 6 requirements also do not support
defendant's argument. Indeed, this Court has previously held that the program certification
regulation "establishes the criteria for certification of a breath testing program, not the
requirements for obtaining a presumptively valid and admissible breath test result" Salt Lake
City v. Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 446 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added) (the regulation at that
time was numbered R735-500-6; it is now R714-500-6). Thus for purposes of admitting breath
test results, program certification requirements are discrete from instrument certification.
Noncompliance with program certification requirements, under the law as interpreted by this
Court, does not affect whether an instrument was properly certified—i.e., shown to be functioning
accurately, so that breath test results obtained therefrom are admissible at a DUI trial.
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The purpose of the program certification regulations, gleaned from reading them as a
whole, is to assure that all law enforcement agencies that perform alcohol breath testing—i.e.,
agencies that have breath test "programs"-perform such testing in the manner prescribed by the
Public Safety Department. Toward that end, the program certification regulations prescribe the
monthly instrument inspections, R714-500-6D(3) & -(4), and require the breath test technician to
keep the monthly certification log ("permanent record book"), R714-500-6D(5), commemorating
those inspections. Once again, the program certification regulations do not specify any particular
method of recording the monthly certification results in the certification log.
Also contained within program certification regulations—and central to defendant
Garcia's argument on appeal—is a subsection prescribing how breath test programs will record
"analytical results." That subsection, R714-500-6D(6), states:
All analytical results shall be expressed in terminology established by state
statute and reported to two decimal places for a 4011 series intoxilyzer, and to
three decimal places for a 5000 series intoxilyzer. (For example, a result of 0.237
g/210L shall be reported as 0.23 on a 4011 series intoxilyzer, or 0.237 g/210L
shall be reported as 0.237 on a 5000 series intoxilyzer, or as stated by the
Department [)].
Defendant argues that "analytical results," which must be reported to three decimal places on the
Intoxilyzer 5000, include the measurements obtained when the instruments are tested each month
on known reference samples (Br. of Appellant at 11). But no portion of the regulations plainly
declares* that "analytical results" include the results of known reference sample testing during the
monthly instrument certification.
To the contrary, reading the above-quoted subsection in its context as a program
certification requirement, it is readily apparent that "analytical results" do not include the results
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of known reference sample testing; rather, "analytical results" are the results obtained when a
DUI arrestee's breath is tested. For one thing, as observed by the trial court (R. 72), the "three
decimal places" requirement, for the Intoxilyzer 5000, stands in contrast to the "two decimals"
requirement for the less precise predecessor instrument, the Intoxilyzer 4011. Thus the "three
decimals" requirement simply contrasts the older instrument with the newer one, and directs
breath test programs to record their breath test results in accord with their particular instruments'
capabilities. Further, the parenthetical example in the regulation, 0.237 g/210L, is the type of
result that would be achieved from actual breath testing, not from known reference sample
testing, which utilizes known samples of 0.100, 0.200, and the like (see certification log in Br. of
Appellant appendix D). Thus by clear implication, the term "analytical results" refers to breath
test results, not to results of known reference sample testing. Cf Westerman v. State, 525 P.2d
1359 (Okl. Crim. App. 1974) (distinguishing "procedures for analysis," from "maintenance
requirements" for breath test instruments).
Defendant Garcia also attempts to engraft, into the monthly certification log, the
regulatory requirement that breath test instruments read results in grams of alcohol per 210 liters
of breath, found in both the instrument certification and program certification regulations, R714500-5B(4) and R714-500-6D(4). But that "reads in grams" requirement, as the trial court also
observed (R. 72-73), simply tracks a statutory requirement, found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-644(2)(c) (1993) (Utah's DUI statute), specifying the measurement unit for blood and breath
alcohol test results; it is, as the above-cited regulation states, "the terminology established by
state statute." An instrument that gives results in some other units—such as ounces per gallon,
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for example—is not acceptable under Utah statute, no matter how accurately it may give those
results. The statutory "reads in grams" requirement, echoed in the regulations, says nothing
about how monthly known reference sample testing should be recorded in the certification log; it
is a discrete statutory requirement (R. 73).
As just explained, the trial court correctly declined to adopt defendant Garcia's
hypertechnical incorporation of discrete breath test instrument and program certification
requirements into one another. The trial court read the regulations as a whole, yet did not lose
track of the differing purpose of each regulatory subsection. And again—the trial court did not
find, nor does defendant identify, any regulatory or statutory language that squarely requires the
full numeric results of known reference sample testing to be written into the monthly certification
log. As far as the written law is concerned, "OK is OK."
This conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the legitimate underlying policy
concerns. Because an arrestee's breath test result will obviously be a focal point of the ensuing
DUI prosecution, it is wholly proper, and highly desireable, that such analytical result be
recorded to the requisite three decimal places, rather than "rounding off such result or merely
noting that it exceeded the statutory .080 level for impairment. Accordingly, the breath test
regulations command that the actual results of actual breath tests be noted to three decimal places
(or two, if on the older instrument). Indeed, defendant Garcia notes that such three decimal place
individual test results are recorded in a separate log book, not the certification log, kept at each
Intoxilyzer site (Br. of Appellant at 13-14 & appendix E).
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No similar urgency attends the results of monthly known reference sample testing, as
demonstrated by a commonsense understanding of the exactitude required to support the "OK"
entry in the certification log. There are sixteen ounces in a pound, and yet a gram is only about
1/28 ounce. The standard breath volume for Intoxilyzer results is 210 liters, which is
approximately the size of a 55-gallon oil drum. To justify an "OK" entry on the certification log,
and a "yes" on the Intoxilyzer Affidavit, the Intoxilyzer must measure a known reference sample
of .200 gram in a range from .190 to .210 gram (five percent), in that 210 liter volume. This .020
gram range equates to 1/1400 of an ounce (.020 times 1/28) within that roughly 55 gallon
volume. If the instrument misses that range by even .001 gram--e.g., if it reads .189 or .211, the
technician cannot certify the instrument for service. Therefore, even without entry of the exact
readings taken from known reference samples, satisfaction of the .005 or five percent standard,
reflected in the "OK" certification log entry and the "yes" Affidavit entry, proves that the
instrument was operating accurately—that is, within its strict accuracy standard. It is neither
required nor necessary that the actual numeric reading be written in the certification log.
In the end, a good analogy might be made to a simple ruler. The .005 gram or 5 percent
accuracy requirement for the Intoxilyzer 5000 is analogous to the width of a ruler's lines,
marking off the ruler's gradations. So long as a known quantity of alcohol meets the .005 gram
or 5 percent standard, or a stick of known length reaches to the appropriate line on the ruler, the
instrument—be it Intoxilyzer or ruler—can be confidently deemed accurate. That is what is
reflected by Trooper Hathcock's "OK" notation in the Intoxilyzer certification log: the known
reference sample tested "on the line." Because the line is extremely thin, exactly where "within

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
State v. Garcia, Page 15

the line" the sample tested is of no significance. There is no need to document that particular
measurement; nor do the governing regulations require such documentation.
In sum, the trial court correctly held that the breath test regulations do not require entry of
actual, numeric known reference sample test results into the monthly Intoxilyzer certification log.
Instead, "OK is OK." For this reason, the trial court's judgment, and defendant Garcia's
conviction, should be affirmed.
POINT TWO
EVEN IF THE BREATH TEST REGULATIONS REQUIRE
ENTRY OF NUMERIC REFERENCE SAMPLE READINGS
INTO THE CERTIFICATION LOG, THE FAILURE TO DO SO
DOES NOT JUSTIFY SUPPRESSION OR EXCLUSION OF
BREATH TEST RESULTS
Even if this Court endorses defendant's reading of the breath test regulations, it should
not order the sweeping remedy that he demands—suppression or exclusion of the breath test
result in this and similar DUI cases. Even assuming that Trooper Hathcock failed to obey the
regulations, such error does not rise to the level of an evidentiary or constitutional violation.
Accordingly, suppression or exclusion are not appropriate.
A. Recordkeeping Errors Do Not Justify Exclusion or Suppression of Evidence.
The error alleged by defendant is simply one of recordkeeping: he asserts that actual
numbers, instead of the notation "OK," must be entered into the monthly Intoxilyzer certification
log.3 In accord with sound precedent, this Court has succinctly answered the claim that such

3

In his brief, defendant accuses the State of "misleadingly referring] to the violation in this case as a
'bookkeeping' error" (Br. of Appellant at 23). At oral argument of his motion, defense counsel stated: "I am
not, there's no question that, here whether or not every 40 days Trooper Hathcock went and he tested that
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error justifies exclusion of evidence: "We likewise decline to elevate administrative
bookkeeping requirements to the status of rules of evidence." Salt Lake City v. Emerson, 861
P.2d 443, 447 (Utah App. 1993) (holding that failure to complete pre-test Intoxilyzer checklist
did not justify exclusion of breath test result). In State v. Vigil, 772 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1989)
(described in this briefs Statement of Facts), this Court held that successful "bookending" is not
a requirement for admission of breath test results (the instrument in Vigil had passed its monthly
certification prior to the defendant's breath test, but had subsequently malfunctioned).
Other cases are in accord with this Court's holdings in Vigil and Emerson. For example,
in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the
Internal Revenue Service's violation of its regulations for taperecording taxpayer interviews did
not justify exclusion of evidence obtained thereby. Further, in Scott v. United States, 436 U.S.
128 (1978), the Supreme Court declined to suppress wiretapping evidence that had been obtained
in violation of statutory "minimization" rules. Consistent with such cases, the Utah Supreme
Court, in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Auditing Division of Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 842 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1992), stated that "courts should also uphold reasonable and rational departures from
[administrative] rules absent a showing that the departure violated some other right."
At most, this case involves a reasonable regulatory departure that violates no right of
defendant. As previously explained, the log notation "OK," along with the "yes" entry on the
Intoxilyzer Affidavits, shows that the instrument in question tested known reference samples
within a remarkably strict accuracy standard. Therefore, even if the regulations call for entry of
machine. There's no question. The argument is that it wasn't reported as required by the rules. When it's not
reported as required by the rules, it's violating the processes that's been set out" (T. 27) (emphasis added).
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numbers, rather than "OK," in the certification log, Trooper Hathcock's use of "OK" should be
deemed a reasonable departure from those regulations. Additionally, it should be self-evident
that Hathcock's bookkeeping method violates no meaningful individual rights. As already
explained, the statutory right, under section 41-6-44.3, is to be tested with an accurate
instrument. The statute does not even tell the Public Safety Department what the accuracy
standard should be—much less how to keep its record books. Therefore, even assuming a
violation of the Department's recordkeeping requirements, such violation does not rise to a level
that justifies the sweeping remedy of exclusion or suppression.
A well-reasoned case from the Washington Supreme Court, State v. Wittenbarger, 880
P.2d 517 (Wash. 1994) (en banc), further supports the conclusion that no significant right is
violated by the "OK" bookkeeping method in this case. In Wittenbarger, the en banc supreme
court held that that as a matter of constitutional law, breath test technicians need not record any
of the numeric readings yielded during the periodic (yearly) inspection of the breath test
instruments (DataMasters) used in that state. 880 P.2d at 519-27. The defendants in
Wittenbarger raised a due process-based "duty to preserve evidence" argument with respect to
those readings, under California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984). In this case, defendant
Garcia similarly argued that he was entitled to know the exact numeric results of the monthly
known reference sample readings (T. 34).
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the "duty to preserve" argument, finding no
basis to believe that the nonpreserved evidence was potentially exculpatory. Therefore, the state
had no duty to preserve it:
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In our view, the records currently available to the defense contain ample
information regarding the condition of the DataMasters. The new [inspection]
protocols, coupled with the improved DataMaster technology, create a system of
accurate and reliable chemical breath analysis. Absent a more convincing
showing by the defense, we make no finding of bad faith and, thus, find no due
process violation.
Id. at 523. Accord Emerson, 861 P.2d at 448 (no duty to preserve test cards noting insufficient
initial breath samples); Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 51A P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978)
(failure to check one box on breath test checklist did not justify suppression of test result). The
analysis in Wittenbarger is thorough and sound.4 Along with the above-cited Utah and federal
authority, it teaches that there is no individual right violation in Trooper Hathcock's use of "OK"
to document the Intoxilyzers' satisfactory measurements of known reference samples.
Common sense also demonstrates that the actual readings yielded from "known reference
sample" testing could not be sufficiently exculpatory to require that they be written into the
certification log, or preserved in any way. Awareness of the regulatory standard for Intoxilyzer
accuracy gives DUI defendants adequate information, comparable to the missing actual test
numbers, for use at trial. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 (state's duty to preserve evidence
applies only when evidence has apparent exculpatory value and when defendant cannot
reasonably obtain comparable evidence). Recall once again that the Intoxilyzer certification or

4

The Washington Supreme Court has operated at the forefront of judicial analysis of breath test results, dating
back to State v. Baker, 355 P.2d 806 (Wash. 1960) (en banc), which gave us the "Baker rule."
Defendant Garcia really only offers one potentially-supporting case, State v. Brown, 672 N.E.2d 1050 (Ohio
App. 4 Dist. 1996), in support of his argument. Brown, a 2-1 decision, held that the exact concentration of the
known reference sample had not been properly proven when it was certified to have a "target value of 0.10
g/210L plus or minus .005." The majority in Brown, citing expert testimony from the defense, held that "0.10"
is not necessarily equal to "0.100," and therefore, the instrument in question might not have been adequately
inspected using the reference sample in question. In this case, defendant produced no expert testimony to support
his bid for suppression. No other case cited by defendant is similar to Brown. Those cases are distinguishable
from this case as well, and are summarized in appendix II of this brief.
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"bookending" readings had to pass the .005 gram or five percent accuracy standard, or else the
technician could not have certified, under oath, that the instrument was functioning properly.
This information gave defendant Garcia the knowledge that his breath alcohol level, which the
instrument measured at .186 gram/210L, was actually within a range from .178 to .194 (the five
percent standard). This allowed him to argue--fo the trier of fact—that such range of possible
"true" readings might raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Cf Emerson, 861 P.2d at 447-48.
Such argument seems unlikely to succeed, given that the statutory impairment standard, Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997), is only .080 gram/210L.
However, a DUI defendant who tested at the .080 level could argue that his "true" reading
could be as low as .075 gram (the .005 gram standard). Absent other evidence of impairment
(such as driving pattern, field sobriety tests, and so forth), such a defendant might be acquitted in
a DUI trial. But neither defendant Garcia, nor a defendant whose breath alcohol reading is at the
statutory borderline, needs to know the exact "bookending" readings in order to receive a fair
trial—that is, a trial that grants a fair opportunity to defend, and will reach a just result. That, as a
matter of substantial rights, is all that is required.5 For this reason, too, the trial court's
judgment, and defendant Garcia's conviction, should be affirmed.
B. No Remedy Beyond Denial of Hearsay-Based Foundation Can be Required.
Finally, if this Court holds that the breath test regulations were violated, and further holds
that such violation was not a reasonable departure from the regulations, defendant still is not

5

"[A] state procedure does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method may seem to our
thinking to be fairer or wiser or to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the bar." Medina v.
California, 505 U.S. 437, 451 (1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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entitled to the sweeping remedy of exclusion or suppression of his breath test result. All that
would be required is a ruling that the prosecution cannot prove the Intoxilyzers' accuracy by
hearsay, as provided in section 41-6-44.3, but must instead do so in non-hearsay fashion, i.e., by
Trooper Hathcock's live testimony. In this case, the trial court did not address this fallback
contention from the State; nevertheless, it was raised, and is therefore preserved for appellate
review (R. 71, 73). See State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). Further, this final State's
argument has been adopted by some of the other trial courts to consider the "OK" issue (Br. of
Appellant at 15 n.15), so that appellate guidance is warranted.
The appropriateness of a limited remedy for the alleged regulatory violation is apparent
from the final subsection of the breath test statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.3 (1993). That
subsection states that if the proffered hearsay—Intoxilyzer Affidavits and the like—is in order,
"there is a presumption that the test results are valid andfurther foundation for introduction of
the [breath test] evidence is unnecessary." Subsec. 41-6-44.3(3) (emphasis added). By obvious
implication, if those hearsay documents are not in order, there is no presumption of validity, and
further foundation must be laid for admission of the breath test result. In no way does the breath
test statute exclude breath test evidence altogether if the hearsay documents are unsatisfactory.
This conclusion is supported by prior judicial examinations of Utah's breath test statute.
The Utah Supreme Court has observed that the statute is intended to relieve DUI prosecutors "of
the financial burden of calling as a witness in every DUI case the public officer responsible for
testing the accuracy of the breathalyzer equipment." Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1319-
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20 (Utah 1983) {cited and quoted in Emerson, 861 P.2d at 445-46). The statute has never been
construed to require exclusion of breath test evidence if its conditions are not met.6
To the contrary, if the hearsay foundation is in order, the breath test statute creates a
rebuttable presumption, consistent with the "universal acceptance" of breath test reliability, Hall,
663 P.2d at 1320, that the defendant's test result is accurate. Consistent with the statutory text
and with Hall, failure to establish that foundation by hearsay means only that the prosecution
must establish that foundation by live testimony. See Oveson, 514 P.2d at 804-05 (live testimony
by testing officer overcame defect of his failure to check one box on breath test checklist).7 Thus
in this case, the State would call Trooper Hathcock to testify about the monthly "bookend"
Intoxilyzer certifications that he performed prior to and after defendant Garcia's breath was
tested. But no further remedy is due to defendant Garcia, and other like-situated DUI defendants,
for the recordkeeping error alleged in cases such as this one. For this reason also, the trial court's
denial of defendant Garcia's motion to suppress should be affirmed.

6

In fact, Hall indicates that when the hearsay foundation is adequate, the prosecution should be entitled to a jury
instruction explaining the rebuttable presumption that the breath test is reliable. Defendant may then introduce
evidence to rebut that presumption. See Hall, 663 P.2d at 1322.
7
The Alaska Supreme Court further justified its holding as follows: "A clerical error by the test operator ought
not to render the results inadmissible without a showing that the validity of the results is tainted. Were we to hold
otherwise, we would be inviting a contest to find technical defects, regardless of their impact on the validity of the
test results." 574 P.2d at 805.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
State v. Garcia, PAGE 22

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant Garcia's DUI conviction should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ( ? day of November, 1997.
E. NEAL GUNNARSON
District Attorney for Salt Lake County

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellee
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APPENDIX I
Intoxilyzer Affidavits

State of Utah
STATE'S EXHIBIT
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Governor
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CUSTODIAN CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, state that:
1. I am the Breathtesting Supervisor of the Utah Highway Patrol and the official keeper of and
responsible for the maintenance check records of the breathtesting instruments maintained in the
State of Utah.
Attached are true and correct copies of the records of maintenance and certification for the
Intoxilyzer serial number _ (etc -PC ^ / / 7 7
located at ^\M{
^Ulafo^
of
which are kept on file by me, in the course of official business, for the State of Utah, Department
of Public Safety and in accordance with the current regulations of the Commissioner of Public
Safety.
3. The attached tests were done before and after the date of

The breathtest technician (s) whose signature (s) appear on the attached affidavit (s) are certified
by the State of Utah and has/have met all of the following requirements as required by the
Department of Public Safety:
Satisfactory completion of operator's initial certification course and/or renewal course;
Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's course offered by the
Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as approved by the Breath Alcohol
Testing Program;
Satisfactory completion of a Breath Alcohol Testing Instrument Manufacturer's
Maintenance/Repair Technician course for the instruments in use in the State of Utah or is
qualified by nature of his/her employment or training to maintain/repair those instruments;
Maintain Technician's status through a minimum of eight (8) hours related training each
calender year.
I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters! alleged inthis affidavit.
NOTARY PUBLIC
IRENE G. SWENSON
5757 South 320 West
Murray, Utah 84107
My Commission Expires
August 1,1998

STATE OF UTAH

idy Hamaker
Breathtesting Supervisor
Utah Highway Patrol

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF 1>a,U-lftkg f )
r^
ON THE ??A DAY O F T M r . j i
19°77. PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, JUDY HAMAKER, WHO
BEING DULY SWORN BEFORE J^fe EXECUTED THE ABOVE REFERENCED CERTIFICATE AND I CERTIFY THAT
SAID PERSON IS AN OFFICER AM) EMPLOYEE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE STATE OF
UTAH AND IS THE LEGAL CUSTODIAN OF THE INTOXILYZER AFFIDAVITS OF SAID DEPARTMENT AND
THAT HER SIGNATURE AFFIXED HERETO IS GENUINE.
NOTARY PUBLIC

\%\?-Ai I]

^qtnsy)

.•AH DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY RECORD OF INTQXILYZER TEST AND AFFIDAVTT .L5000_L
We t h e u n d e r s i g n e d , b e i n g f i r s t d u l y s w o r n , s t a t e t h a t :
_

1.

B r e a t h t e s t i n g instrument'INTOXILYZER, s e r i a l number & b -QQ3>H7"?
l o c a t e d at^QCrrrtc^ftrr/AKe. P.O.
.was p r o p e r l y checked by m e / u s i n
t h e c o u r s e of o f f i c i a l d u t i e s , on Q*-l APKSC 1 9 9 6
a t iO'3o AM
T h i s was d d n e by a c u r r e n t l y c e r t i f i e d t e c h n i c i a n and a c c o r d i n g t o
t h e s t a n d a r d s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r of t h e U t a h D e p a r t m e n t
of P u b l i c S a f e t y .
T h i s i s t h e o f f i c i a l r e c o r d and n o t e s of t h i s p r o c e d u r e w h i c h w e r e
made a t t h e t i m e t h e s e t e s t s were d o n e .

2.

3.
4.

I am/we a r e c o m p e t e n t t o t e s t i f y and h a v e p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e of
m a t t e r s alleged in t h i s
affidavit.
THE
YES
NO
( *^ FOLLOWING
ElectricaT
l E Sp T
o Sw eWERE
r c h eMADE:
ck:
( R e d p o w e r s w i t c h on ( R e a d s , " N o t R e a d y " )
( */)
( ^ T e m p e r a t u r e C h e c k ( R e a d s " P u s h b u t t o n t o s t a r t , " e t c • ) . . . ( \y^
( • f I n t e r n a l P u r g e Check:
( a i r p u m p w o r k s , r u n s f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15 s e c o n d s )
( iS*\

( is*f I n t e r n a l C a l i b r a t i o n C h e c k :
(3 s t a n d a r d s . 1 0 0 , . 2 0 0 , . 3 0 0 , w i t h i n + o r - . 0 0 5 o r 5%
whichever i s the greatest
(
( ^) I n v a l i d t e s t (Push green s t a r t button while instrument
i s i n t e s t mode, i n s t r u m e n t w i l l p r i n t " I n v a l i d T e s t " ) . . . (
( is^ D i a g n o s t i c c h e c k (Prom c h e c k , Ram c h e c k , Temp c h e c k ,
P r o c e s s o r check, P r i n t e r check)
(
( ^f C h e c k e d w i t h known s a m p l e : ( s i m u l a t o r , 3 t e s t s w i t h i n
+ o r - . 0 0 5 o r 5% w h i c h e v e r i s t h e g r e a t e s t )
(
( <xjT"Gives r e a d i n g s i n g r a m s of a l c o h o l p e r 210 l i t e r s of
breath
(
REPAIRS REQUIRED ( Explain)
t^Ci RePfrSRS

\y^
:/)
i/}
£/)
^)
)

_ _ _ (

( ^T^The simulator solution was of the correct kind and
properly compounded
( L^f^The results of this test show that the instrument is
working properly
Last p r i o r

c h e c k of

this

the

^r

( /)
( ^*j

<££_.

i n s t r u m e n t was d o n e on

Ci\
/)lA(3Cfl
CERTIFIED BREATH-TEST TECHNICIAN ( S )

NOTARY PUBLIC."
GRETCHEN LOWE
8757 South 320 W*«t
Murray. Utah W107

I/We,

||»Conwni*»ionExpl«»
8«pt«mb«f8.1898

on o a t h ,

state

tha-t

(

CT ATE OF UTAH

Subscribed

and

sworn

before

[ijrkJnui retire
Notary/Public

me t h i s

,

MTn

day

of.

o

going

is

true,

_isQlo-

rAIi DEPT. OF PUBLIC SAFETY RECORD OF INTQXILYZER TEST AND AFFIDAVTT fSQQQ^
We the undersigned, being firs^t duly sworn, state that:
1.
Breath testing instrument INTOXILYZER, serial number <o^> - O Q 3 M 7 7
located atc^r^n^o>XCT^V<g. *ft D. was properly checked by me/us in
the course of official duties, on
Q(b M M 1 9 %
at Q 8 : 6 3 A M .
2.
This was d<3ne by a currently certified technician and according to
the standards established by the Commissioner of the Utah Department
of Public Safety.
3.
This is the official record and notes of this procedure which were
made at the time these tests were done.
4.
I am/we are competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the
matters alleged in this affidavit.
THE FOLLOWING TESTS WERE MADE:
YES
NO
') Electrical power check:
(Red power switch on (Reads, "Not Ready" )
^) Temperature Check (Reads "Push button to start," etc.)..
S) internal Purge Check:
(air pump works, runs for approximately 15 seconds) . . . .
/
* ) Internal Calibration Check:
(3 standards .100, .200, .300, within + or - .005 or 5%
whichever is the greatest
/) Invalid test (Push green start button while instrument
is in test mode, instrument will print "Invalid Test").
^) Diagnostic check (Prom check, Ram check, Temp check,
Processor check, Printer check)
•'') Checked with known sample: (simulator, 3 tests within
+ or - . 005 or 5% whichever is the greatest)
) Gives readings in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of...
breath
REPAIRS REQUIRED ( Explain)
N\Q^£_
( cQPS&ito ftsse^ -TSflve. ^

c^V^iGtrr S&MAI^S ~mcx\z \

)

^ f The simulator solution was of the correct kind and
properly compounded
*/)'The results of this test show that the instrument is
working properly

CA

Last prior check of this instrument was done on

AegftL

-T

19^fa

CERTIFIED BREATH
SREATH TEST T E C H N I C I A N ( S )

/icTUcoa/—^
We, on o a t h ,

Subscribed,^tnd

Notaj

oibyic

s w o r n b e f o r e me t h i s

s t a t e that the foregoing

ffy day of

Mfrj

is
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true
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APPENDIX II
Synopsis of Cases Cited by Defendant
(ref. to fh. 4 of this brief)

The following noncontrolling cases relied upon by defendant Garcia are off-point from
the claim of error that he asserts in this appeal.

Lake v. MVD, 892 P.2d 1025 (Or. App. 1995) (Br. of Appellant at 17). Held: Breath test
result suppressed because inspecting technician failed to sign the certification report. (In Utah,
this would be equivalent to having unsigned, unsworn Intoxilyzer Affidavits.)

Westerman v. State, 525 P.2d 1359 (Okl. Crim. App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 17).
Held: Breath test result suppressed because prosecution presented no evidence that the
instrument had been certified (in Utah, equivalent to providing no proof whatsoever of the
instrument's accuracy). Also, the officer who tested defendant's breath did not testify that he
followed prescribed breath test procedure.

Bryant v. Comm r ofDep 't of Public Safety, 937 P.2d 496 (Okl. 1996) (Br. of Appellant
at 17). Held: Breath test result suppressed because prosecution failed to provide defendant with
preserved breath sample when preserved sample was timely requested under state statute. The
agency had lost defendant's request and destroyed the breath sample.

State v. Fogle, 459 P.2d 873 (Or. 1969) (en banc) (Br. of Appellant at 19). Held: Breath
test result suppressed because prosecution had failed to prove that the instrument had been "spotchecked" and certified for accuracy every 60 days as required by statute. (No proof that
instrument was accurate.)

Keel v. State, 609 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1980) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath test
result suppressed because pre-test calibration/certification had not been proven to have been
performed by a "qualified Breathalyzer instructor" as required by regulations.

Klebs v. State, 305 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath
test result suppressed because prosecution failed to establish any of the three elements of
foundation—that test was given by certified operator, that instrument had been tested and
approved, and that operator used approved testing technique.

State v. Krause, 405 So.2d 832 (La. 1981) (Br. of Appellant at 20). Held: Breath test
result suppressed because prosecution did not prove satisfactory pre-test "spot check" of
chemical "ampul" used in the testing instrument, as required during instrument recertification
every four months.

State v. Hall 315 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio App. 1974) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath
test result suppressed because prosecution failed to show that calibration solution (known
reference sample) used to certify the instrument had not exceeded its labelled shelf life.

State v. Fellows, 352 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio App. 1975) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held:
Breath test result suppressed because certification/calibration officer failed to testify about
successful pre-test inspection and calibration. The use of his certification log page, without his
testimony, violated constitutional confrontation right.

State v. Dyer, 233 S.E.2d 309 (W.Va. 1977) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath test
result suppressed because prosecution failed to prove that routine calibrations/inspections had
been conducted every ten tests or nine days as required by statute and by regulation.

State v. Wills, 359 So.2d 566 (Fla. App. 1978) (Br. of Appellant at 21). Held: Breath test
result suppressed because test equipment, in violation of explicit regulation, had been left
accessible to persons who were not authorized breath test technicians.

State v. Koch, 671 N.E.2d 333 (Ohio App. 1996) (Br. of Appellant at 27). Held: Breath
test result suppressed because instrument had not been tested for possible interference by all
three bands of possible radio interference, as required by regulation.

People v. Orth, "330 N.E.2d 210" (111. 1988) (Br. of Appellant at 27-28). State's counsel
could not find this case at the identified citation.

